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Abstract    
This paper studies integration of regional goods markets in Russia over 2001–2015 with the 
use of time series analysis, based on the law of one price as the criterion of market 
integration. The cost of a staples basket is used as a price representative. The analysis 
involves all pairs of country’s regions, thus providing a comprehensive pattern of market 
integration. The region pairs are classified as belonging to one of four groups: integrated, 
conditionally integrated, not integrated but tending towards integration, and neither 
integrated nor tending towards integration. The results suggest that only less than a quarter of 
region pairs fall into the fourth category.  
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1. Introduction 
A spatially separated market for a tradable good is deemed integrated if there are no barriers to trade 
between its spatial segments, except for ‘natural,’ geographically determined barriers, i.e. 
disconnectedness of the segments (quantified by transportation costs). Considering a national 
market, its spatial segments are regional markets (hereafter, simply regions). In the integrated 
market, goods arbitrage results in spatial equilibrium that manifests itself in the law of one price. In 
its strict form, when transportation costs may be neglected (if they are very small as compared to the 
price of the good or the price includes average transportation costs), the law states that the price of 
the same good should be equal across all regions. A weakened version of the law takes account of 
‘natural’ barriers to trade, allowing the price of the good to differ between two regions by no more 
than transportation costs (per unit of the good). Thus, the law of one price can be applied as the 
criterion of market integration.      
Testing for the law of one price in its strict or weakened version is a common exercise in 
studies of market integration. However, it overlooks an important transitional case. Despite the price 
differs between two regions, regional prices can converge to each other, eventually eliminating the 
price disparity. Thus, albeit this pair of regions is not integrated, it tends towards integration over 
time.  
This paper analyzes time series of the cost of a staples basket over 2001–2015 with a monthly 
frequency across all pairs of Russian regions, providing a comprehensive pattern of market 
integration in the country. The region pairs are classified as belonging to one of four groups. The 
first one is integrated pairs, i.e. those where the strict law of one price holds. The second group is 
conditionally integrated pairs, where the weakened law of one price holds (the next section explains 
why integration is deemed conditional in this case). The third group is region pairs tending towards 
integration. Following a method put forward in Gluschenko (2011), the movement towards 
integration is modeled by a nonlinear asymptotically decaying trend of price disparity (however, 
unlike that paper, with the use of three different types of the trend). At last, the fourth group is      
neither integrated nor tending-towards-integration region pairs. The results obtained suggest that this 
group contains less than 24% of region pairs. 
A number of papers investigate spatial pattern of market integration in Russia, using different 
product and location samples as well as time spans. Gardner and Brooks (1994) study market 
integration in Russia in 1992–1993, using data for six food commodities across 14 cities in the 
Volga economic area. They pool time series for all pairs of cities into a data panels (separately for 
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each commodity). This allows including time invariant variables such as distance, price regulations, 
etc., but yields results averaged across city pairs, hence an overly aggregated pattern of market 
integration (so that its dimension disappears). Berkowitz et al. (1998) analyze time series of prices 
for five foods across 13 to 25 cities from the European part of Russia in 1992–1995. They do not 
address directly to the issue of market integration, focusing on the relationship between the behavior 
of prices of similar goods across cities, which provides an indirect indications of integration. 
Goodwin et al. (1999) consider prices for four goods across five cities of Russia during 1993–1994, 
analyzing linkages of prices in each pair of cities with the use of cointegration, Granger causality, 
and impulse response techniques. They interpret the presence of the price linkages as evidence in 
favor of market integration. Gluschenko (2011) uses the cost of a staples basket relative to a 
benchmark region across almost all regions of Russia (represented by their capital cities) over 1994–
2000. Using time series analysis, regions are broken down into three groups: integrated with the 
benchmark region, tending towards integration with it, and neither integrated nor tending towards 
integration. Akhmedjonov and Lau (2012) deal with prices for four energy products in all Russian 
regions relative to the national average prices during 2003–2010. They focus on convergence of 
prices, applying time series modeling with a nonlinear trend (the argument of which is the lag of the 
relative price rather than time). A similar methodology is used in Lau and Akhmedjonov (2012), 
where convergence of aggregated (relative) prices for outer clothing across 44 regions of Russia for 
2002–2009 is explored. This paper contributes to the above literature, providing a spatial pattern of 
market integration in Russia that involves all pairs of country’s regions. (To my knowledge, such a 
work was not done as yet for any country with a significant number of regions.) In some respect, it 
supplements results of Gluschenko (2011), extending them to the 2000s.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expounds methodology applied. 
In Section 3, empirical data used for the analysis are described .Section 4 reports and discusses the 
estimation results. Section 5 compares results obtained with those for 1994–2000. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
Let pr(t) and ps(t) be prices for a tradable good in regions r and s, respectively, at time point t; 
hereafter, t = 0,…, T. Then the strict version of the law of one price is formalized as 
pr(t)/ps(t) = 1.            (1) 
If relationship (1) holds for region pair (r, s), these regions are deemed integrated with each other. 
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The weakened version of the law of one price can be modeled as 
pr(t)/ps(t) = 1 + Drs,           (2) 
where Drs is a (percent) price disparity between regions r and s. When this relationship holds for 
these regions, they are deemed conditionally integrated. They could be acknowledged as integrated 
on condition that the disparity is due to transportation costs only. However, it can include also 
effects or ‘artificial’ impediments to integration, such as regional protectionism, local price 
regulations, organized crime, etc. In the framework of time series analysis, it is impossible to reveal 
the nature of Drs, therefore the term ‘conditional integration’ is applied.  
The movement towards integration (price convergence) is described as 
pr(t)/ps(t) = 1 + Drs(t),           (3) 
where Drs(t) is an asymptotically decaying function such that Drs(t) → 0 as t → ∞ and 
sign(Drs(0))⋅dDrs(t)/dt < 0. Regions in the pair (r, s) tend to integrate with each other, if (3) holds for 
it. To model price convergence, three types of trend functions are applied (to economize notation, 
the region indices for parameters as well as disturbances in regressions below are suppressed): 
Drs(t) = γeδt,  δ < 0,          (4a) 
Drs(t) = exp(γeδt) – 1,  δ < 0,         (4b) 
1)
1
exp()( −
+
=
t
tDrs δ
γ , δ > 0.         (4c) 
An advantage of function (4a) is the ease of interpretation: γ is immediately the initial (at t = 
0) price disparity; δ characterizes convergence speed in a simple way, e.g. time needed for the 
disparity to halve (half-life time) is computed as log(0.5)/δ. Its shortcoming is that the permutation 
of the region indices – from (r, s) to (s, r) – changes the values of γ and δ. In functions (4b) and (4c), 
initial disparity is eγ – 1; half-life times depend on both δ and γ and are more complex. On the other 
hand, the permutation of the region indices changes only the sign of γ,  keeping δ invariant.  
If no one of the above three models describes the behavior of prices in region pair (r, s), these 
regions are deemed neither integrated nor tending towards integration with each other (hereafter, 
simply non-integrated for brevity). 
Turning to econometrics, the log transformation is used with time being an index for prices 
rather than the argument of function. Then the dependent variable is the price differential Prst = 
log(prt/pst) = log(prt) – log(pst); now, t = 1,…, T. It is natural to assume that the prices depend on 
their previous values, i.e. they are autocorrelated.  Then the econometric version of Model (1) takes 
the form 
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Prst = νt,νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt,  
where νt is the regression residual, εt is the white-noise random shock, and λ + 1 = ρ is the 
autoregression coefficient. Substituting the second equation into the first one gives the conventional 
AR(1) model with no constant (∆Prst stands for the first difference, ∆Prst ≡ Prst – Prs,t–1): 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + εt.            (5) 
Similarly, the econometric counterpart of Model (2) is the AR(1) model with constant α = 
–λlog(1 + Drs): 
∆Prst = α + λPrs,t–1 + εt.           (6) 
The econometric version of model (3) looks like 
∆Prst = h(t) – (λ + 1)h(t – 1) + λPrs,t–1 + εt.         (7) 
In this equation, h(t) denotes a trend of the price differential, h(t) = log(1 + Drs(t)). This trend 
tends to zero, as time tends to infinity; its initial value is Prs0. Under such transformation, we have 
instead (4a)–(4c) the following trends (respectively): 
log-exponential trend h(t) = log(1 + γeδt,)  δ < 0,       (8a) 
exponential trend h(t) = γeδt,  δ < 0,        (8b) 
fractional trend h(t) = γ/(1 + δt), δ > 0.       (8c) 
A problem in exploring spatial market integration is a great number of region pairs, equaling 
N(N – 1)/2. For instance, 79 Russian regions produce 3081 pairs. There are a few ways to reduce 
dimensionality. The first is to pool time series of all region pairs into a data panel, estimating only 
one panel regression, as, e.g., Gardner and Brooks (1994) do. However, this yields only a 
characterization of the whole market with no geographical dimension. Another way is to use some 
region as a benchmark, i.e. to fix some region index, say, s in regressions (5)–(7), as, e.g., in 
Gluschenko (2011). Then the number of pairs (hence, regressions) equals N – 1. Seemingly, this 
way would provide a comprehensive spatial pattern of integration, since only N – 1 of all pairs are 
independent, making it possible to generate a time series for any other region pair, e.g., Pqrt = Pqst – 
Prst = log(pqt) – log(pst) – (log(prt) – log(pst)). But, unfortunately, autocorrelation of time series leads 
to non-transitivity of statistical inference. For instance, if region pairs (q, s) and (r, s) are integrated, 
i.e. each satisfy Equation (5), this does not imply that pair (q, r) is also integrated. And vice versa, 
despite Pqst and Prst are unit root processes (random walks), Pqrt may manifest regularity of form 
(5)–(7). Thus, we have only a partial spatial pattern which suggests integration with the benchmark 
region, but is silent as to integration of other region pairs. A consequence is that the pattern obtained 
crucially depends on the choice of benchmark region. One more way is to use the national market as 
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the benchmark; that is, the national price (a weighted average of regional prices) serves as the 
numeraire, like, e.g., in Akhmedjonov and Lau (2012). Here, the same problem of non-transitivity as 
above arises. Besides, this way is questionable from the econometrical viewpoint, since price 
differentials involve a mixture of all regional prices. Some of them could be unit root processes, 
spoiling the whole pattern of market integration.  
Thus, the existing ways of reducing the number of pairs do not provide a comprehensive 
pattern of market integration. Therefore regressions (5)–(7) are estimated and tested separately for 
each region pair (r, s) over t = 1,…, T. The most important hypothesis to be tested is whether time 
series Prst has a unit root, Hλ: λ = 0 (against λ < 0). Its rejection implies that the time series is 
stationary, fluctuating around its long-run path. Intuitively this means that when a random shock 
forces the price differential to deviate from the long-path, market forces return it (after a time) back. 
Otherwise, if the time series is non-stationary, no return occurs. The long-run path is the price 
parity, P* = 0, in Model (5), and a time-invariant constant, P* = log(1 + Drs), in Model (6). In the 
case of Model (7), the long-run path is one of the above trends h(t). To test for a unit root, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Plillips-Perron test are applied. The hypothesis of non-stationarity 
is rejected if both tests reject it at the level of 10%. (For technical details of testing, see Appendix).  
Given that Hλ is rejected, statistical significance of the rest parameters – α in (6) and γ and δ in 
(7) – is tested with the use of the conventional t-test at the 10% level. Three varieties of Equation (7) 
are estimated (with each trend). Of them, the variety providing the best fit – namely, the minimal 
sum of squared residuals – is accepted. It is possible in the case of Model (7) that it is significant, 
but δ > 0 in trends (8a) or (8b), or δ < 0 in trend (8c). This implies price divergence, hence the 
respective region pair is deemed non-integrated. 
Not infrequently, a time series Prst satisfies more than one model from their set (5)–(7). Then 
the ‘most proper’ model is to be selected. Two approaches are possible, general to specific and 
specific to general. The general model in this set is (7). It encompasses the rest models: imposing 
restriction δ = 0 on h(t) of the form (8a)–(8c), we get Equation (6), and γ = 0 produces Equation (5). 
Then the analysis of a time series goes from the general Equation (7) to Equation (6) and then to (5), 
accepting the first significant model in this sequence.  
Albeit the general-to-specific approach seems attractive from the theoretical point of view, the 
specific-to-general approach (which implies the reverse sequence) is applied here, based on the 
following intuitive considerations. If a time series satisfies both Equations (5) and (6), it is 
reasonable to assume that although constant α in Equation (6) is statistically significant, it is small 
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and is caused by some accidental reasons (being a statistical artifact) rather than by properties of the 
process itself. Hence, it is logical to accept Model (5). Similarly, when a time series satisfies both 
Equations (6) and (7), the reason is a very weak trend, maybe, incidentally manifesting itself in the 
data. Hence, the model without trend, Equation (6), should be accepted. A random inspection of 
some such cases has confirmed these assumptions.   
 
3. Data 
The Russian Federation consists of constituent units (republics, oblasts, one autonomous oblast, 
krais, autonomous okrugs, and federal cities) termed federal subjects. Despite different designations, 
all these are equal in legal terms. There is a curious feature of the political division of Russia, 
‘composite’ federal subjects, namely, oblasts or krais that include one or more other federal 
subjects, autonomous okrugs. (The Chukchi Autonomous Okrug is the only one that is not a part of 
another federal subject.) Within the time span under consideration, the autonomous okrugs have 
been merging with the oblasts/krais that include them, ceasing to be separate federal subjects (by 
now, only two ‘composite’ federal subjects remain).  
In this study, by a region is meant a federal subject (including federal cities of Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg); however, the composite federal subjects are considered as single regions (namely, 
the Arkhangelsk, Tyumen, and Irkutsk oblasts, and the Transbaikal and Kamchatke krais). The 
spatial sample for the analysis covers 79 regions, all Russia’s regions but the Chechen Republic (as 
well as the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol), where full data on prices are lacking. 
They generate 3081 region pairs. 
An aggregated market for 33 basic foods (staples) is considered, using the cost of a basket of 
these goods as a price representative for the analysis. Rosstat (2005, Appendix 6)1 reports the 
composition of the basket. The analysis covers January 2001 through December 2015 with a 
monthly frequency (180 time observations). The price data are drawn from the Integrated 
Interagency Informational and Statistical System of Russia (EMISS), 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31481.do.       
Figure 1 reports summary statistics – the mean and standard deviation – of the price 
differentials over the time span under consideration. The sign of the price differential depends on the 
order of regions in their pair; therefore a rearrangement of region indexes can change the summary 
statistics. To avoid this effect, the summary statistics are computed for the absolute values of the 
                                                          
1 Available on http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/PRIL6.DOC 
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price differentials, Prst.  
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Figure 1. Summary statistics of absolute price differentials. 
 
Statistics depicted in Figure 1 give an idea of price dispersion in the Russian spatial market. 
As it is seen, the price dispersion is highly volatile with dramatic fluctuations; the maximum to 
minimum ratio equals about 1.5 for both mean and standard deviation. This is due to relatively high 
inflation that greatly differs across regions. On average, monthly inflation rate over 2001–2015 was 
0.85% (10.7% per year), varying across regions from 0.71% to 0.96% (8.9% to 12.1% per year). 
Over time, the mean of the absolute price differential tends to increase, while its standard deviation 
tends to decrease. Assuming a linear trend, the former rises by 0.8% per year, and the latter falls by 
0.6% per year. Thus, it can be concluded that the process of spatial market integration in Russia is 
not completed. It is still in transition; both price convergence and divergence are going on in some 
spatial parts of the market. This makes analyzing only the state of integration with models of the 
form (5) or/and (6) insufficient, which motivates the use of modeling the movement to integration.  
 
4. Empirical results  
Before presenting full results, it is instructive to look at an example of specific region pairs 
belonging to each of four groups: integrated, conditionally integrated, tending towards integration, 
and non-integrated. Figure 2 illustrates these, depicting the actual evolution of the price differentials 
vs. their theoretical long-run paths. No long-run path exists for the non-integrated pair, Figure 2d.  
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a) Integrated regions 
(Oryol Oblast – Altai Krai) 
b) Conditionally integrated regions 
(Novosibirsk Oblast – Altai Krai) 
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c) Regions tending towards integration  
(Moskow Oblast – Altai Krai) 
d) Non-integrated regions 
(Omsk Oblast – Altai Krai) 
Figure 2. Examples of four types of region pairs. 
 
Figure 2 clarifies econometric considerations in the previous section. Equation (5) holds for 
the pair of integrated regions, Figure 2a. The price differential fluctuates around the price parity line 
P* = 0; that is, prices in these regions continually tend to equalize with each other. The conditionally 
integrated pair in Figure 2b satisfies Equation (6). Here, the price differential fluctuates around some 
nonzero constant. This means that prices in these regions tend to maintain a constant price disparity, 
14.4% (on average) in real terms. Regions in Figure 2c are moving to integration with each other. 
This pair satisfies Equation (7) with trend h(t) = 0.273e–0.010t. Over time, the price differential 
diminishes, approaching the parity. Certainly, this does not imply that it necessarily will reach the 
parity. It is possible that beyond the time span under consideration the price differential will come to 
some equilibrium disparity. At last, no one model describes the behavior of price differential in 
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Figure 2d. It is interestingly to note that while the Altai Krai is integrated with the Oryol Oblast and 
not integrated with the Omsk Oblast, the Oryol and Omsk oblasts are conditionally integrated with 
each other, having P* = 0.035 that corresponds to a 3.6% price disparity in real terms. 
Table 1 tabulates the results of analysis across all region pairs in a summarized form. For each 
region, it reports percentage of the rest 78 regions with which the given region is integrated, 
conditionally integrated, tending towards integration, and not integrated (and not tending towards 
integration). In the last case, non-integration can be caused by price divergence, which manifests 
itself in a positive trend factor in trends (8a) and (8b) or negative factor in trend (8c). The percentage 
of such cases is also reported. In fact, the actual cases of divergence may be greater, as trends of the 
form (8a)–(8c) cannot cross zero by construction. Therefore Equation (7) cannot detect divergence 
with a trend crossing zero. The last line in the table reports the total percentage of respective region 
pairs (among all 3081 pairs). 
 
Table 1. Results of the analysis: the pattern of Russia’s market integration (in percentage terms) 
 
Region Integrated with Conditionally 
integrated with 
Tending 
towards 
integration 
with 
Not integrated 
with 
Diverging with 
1. Rep. of Karelia 15.4 65.4 5.1 14.1 7.7 
2. Rep. of Komi  16.7 57.7 2.6 23.1 12.8 
3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 16.7 29.5 2.6 51.3 33.3 
4. Vologda Obl. 16.7 53.8 5.1 24.4 11.5 
5. Murmansk Obl. 9.0 65.4 11.5 14.1 2.6 
6. St. Petersburg City 11.5 50.0 5.1 33.3 11.5 
  7. Leningrad Obl. 20.5 57.7 5.1 16.7 11.5 
  8. Novgorod Obl. 25.6 64.1 1.3 9.0 5.1 
  9. Pskov Obl. 17.9 17.9 10.3 53.8 37.2 
10. Kaliningrad Obl. 16.7 46.2 2.6 34.6 6.4 
11. Bryansk Obl. 30.8 48.7 3.8 16.7 3.8 
12. Vladimir Obl. 33.3 47.4 1.3 17.9 5.1 
13. Ivanovo Obl. 28.2 28.2 7.7 35.9 7.7 
14. Kaluga Obl. 26.9 20.5 11.5 41.0 14.1 
15. Kostroma Obl. 43.6 48.7 1.3 6.4 5.1 
16. Moscow City 10.3 23.1 24.4 42.3 2.6 
17. Moscow Obl. 21.8 43.6 6.4 28.2 9.0 
18. Oryol Obl. 44.9 42.3 3.8 9.0 3.8 
19. Ryazan Obl. 34.6 33.3 1.3 30.8 19.2 
20. Smolensk Obl. 24.4 59.0 3.8 12.8 6.4 
21. Tver Obl. 26.9 44.9 2.6 25.6 7.7 
22. Tula Obl. 29.5 43.6 2.6 24.4 7.7 
23. Yaroslavl Obl. 26.9 39.7 5.1 28.2 20.5 
24. Rep. of Mariy El  29.5 46.2 2.6 21.8 6.4 
25. Rep. of Mordovia 33.3 37.2 0 29.5 16.7 
26. Chuvash Rep.  29.5 50.0 2.6 17.9 3.8 
27. Kirov Obl. 41.0 39.7 0 19.2 14.1 
28. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 28.2 47.4 0 24.4 15.4 
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Region Integrated with Conditionally 
integrated with 
Tending 
towards 
integration 
with 
Not integrated 
with 
Diverging with 
29. Belgorod Obl. 28.2 41.0 0 30.8 24.4 
30. Voronezh Obl. 50.0 34.6 0 15.4 6.4 
31. Kursk Obl. 9.0 12.8 0 78.2 51.3 
32. Lipetsk Obl. 19.2 61.5 1.3 17.9 15.4 
33. Tambov Obl. 23.1 62.8 3.8 10.3 3.8 
34. Rep. of Kalmykia  25.6 24.4 20.5 29.5 1.3 
35. Rep. of Tatarstan  25.6 43.6 5.1 25.6 7.7 
36. Astrakhan Obl. 28.2 38.5 5.1 28.2 9.0 
37. Volgograd Obl. 42.3 39.7 0 17.9 9.0 
38. Penza Obl. 25.6 39.7 0 34.6 24.4 
39. Samara Obl. 26.9 38.5 14.1 20.5 7.7 
40. Saratov Obl. 20.5 11.5 0 67.9 25.6 
41. Ulyanovsk Obl. 26.9 43.6 1.3 28.2 15.4 
42. Rep. of Adygeya  48.7 43.6 1.3 6.4 2.6 
43. Rep. of Dagestan 37.2 30.8 3.8 28.2 6.4 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 56.4 30.8 1.3 11.5 5.1 
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  43.6 48.7 0 7.7 5.1 
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 51.3 41.0 2.6 5.1 1.3 
47. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  32.1 47.4 6.4 14.1 6.4 
48. Krasnodar Krai 30.8 44.9 5.1 19.2 10.3 
49. Stavropol Krai 39.7 39.7 1.3 19.2 9.0 
50. Rostov Obl. 33.3 30.8 2.6 33.3 5.1 
51. Rep. of Bashkortostan  30.8 41.0 5.1 23.1 3.8 
52. Udmurt Rep.  42.3 35.9 1.3 20.5 2.6 
53. Kurgan Obl. 33.3 46.2 5.1 15.4 7.7 
54. Orenburg Obl. 25.6 46.2 0 28.2 5.1 
55. Perm Krai 34.6 47.4 2.6 15.4 6.4 
56. Sverdlovsk Obl. 24.4 60.3 3.8 11.5 6.4 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 44.9 43.6 1.3 10.3 7.7 
58. Rep. of Altai 35.9 38.5 6.4 19.2 15.4 
59. Altai Krai 42.3 39.7 12.8 5.1 0 
60. Kemerovo Obl. 46.2 39.7 0 14.1 9.0 
61. Novosibirsk Obl. 21.8 37.2 7.7 33.3 19.2 
62. Omsk Obl. 33.3 53.8 0 12.8 10.3 
63. Tomsk Obl. 34.6 41.0 6.4 17.9 5.1 
64. Tyumen Obl. 10.3 67.9 12.8 9.0 1.3 
65. Rep. of Buryatia 35.9 38.5 2.6 23.1 9.0 
66. Rep. of Tuva  34.6 57.7 1.3 6.4 6.4 
67. Rep. of Khakasia  43.6 50.0 0 6.4 6.4 
68. Krasnoyarsk Krai 19.2 64.1 2.6 14.1 2.6 
69. Irkutsk Obl. 35.9 53.8 1.3 9.0 5.1 
70. Transbaikal Krai 33.3 56.4 1.3 9.0 5.1 
61. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  0 79.5 3.8 16.7 9.0 
72. Jewish Autonomous Obl. 6.4 51.3 2.6 39.7 7.7 
73. Chukotka A.O. 0 46.2 48.7 5.1 0 
74. Primorsky Krai 1.3 35.9 5.1 57.7 41.0 
75. Khabarovsk Krai 1.3 30.8 2.6 65.4 53.8 
76. Amur Obl. 11.5 33.3 2.6 52.6 25.6 
77. Kamchatka Krai 1.3 79.5 19.2 0 0 
78. Magadan Obl. 1.3 50.0 1.3 47.4 34.6 
79. Sakhalin Obl. 0 56.4 6.4 37.2 3.8 
Total 26.8 44.6 4.7 23.8 11.0 
 
Obl. = Oblast, Rep. = Republic, and A.O. = Autonomous Okrug.  
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Among all region pairs, 71% are integrated or conditionally integrated. Adding pairs tending 
towards integration, we get the total of 76%. Based on this figure, it seems that the state of spatial 
market integration in Russia can be deemed satisfactory. Unfortunately, there is no possibility to 
immediately compare these results with other countries, since so far a similar analysis has not been 
performed for any country. An indirect comparison can be done with results due to Ceglowski 
(2003), who applies a model of form (6) to analyze prices for 45 individual goods across 25 cities in 
Canada (using Ottawa as a benchmark city). Averaging results reported in Ceglowski (2003, Table 
2) over all covered goods, the percentage of cities integrated and conditionally integrated with 
Ottawa equals 55%. 
Given long distances between many regions of Russia and supposing that constant price 
disparities are due to transportation costs only, it is reasonable to expect that conditional integration 
would prevail. That is, indeed, the case; the number of conditionally integrated region pairs is 1.7 
times greater than the number of ‘strictly’ integrated ones. Nonetheless, the latter is substantial, 27% 
of the region pairs. Figure 3 plots distributions of the degree of integration (left panel) and degree of 
integration and conditionally integration in total (right panel) in the form of histograms. The degree 
of integration (etc.) is the percentage of regions that are integrated (etc.) with a given one. Herefrom, 
[x, y) is the interval within which a percentage, Z, lies: x ≤ Z < y.  
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Figure 3. Distributions of the degree of integration and degree of both ‘strict’ and conditional 
integration.  
 
The histogram bar [0, 5) in the left panel of Figure 3 suggests that there are 8.9% of regions (7 
regions of 78) integrated with 0% to less than 5% of other regions. The most frequent case is 
integration with 25% to 30% of other regions; there are 21.5% of such cases. No one region is 
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integrated with more that 60% (in fact, 56.4%) of other regions. Turning to the sum of integrated 
and conditionally integrated regions (the right panel of Figure 3), the ‘worst’ case is 20% to 25%; 
hence there are no regions without conditional integration with other ones. In most cases (75.9%2), 
regions are integrated, ‘strictly’ and conditionally, with 65% to 95% of other regions. Specific 
regions that determine the left-most and right-most bars in these and next histograms will be named 
below. 
Processes of price convergence, i.e. the movement towards integration, do take place in the 
Russian market. However, they are relatively rare, occurring only in 5% of region pairs. Figure 4 
plots distribution of the degree of tending towards integration. The most cases are concentrated in 
the range of 0 to 5%, making up 64.6%. Of them, cases of no convergence give17.9%; price 
convergence with one region gives 19.2%. The only region (1.3%) tends towards integration with a 
great number – namely, 48.7% – of other regions.  
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Figure 4. Distribution of the degree of tending towards integration. 
 
Almost a quarter of region pairs are classed as non-integrated. Recall that non-integration 
means that a region pair not only is not integrated, ‘strictly’ or conditionally, but also does not tend 
towards integration. The left panel of Figure 5 plots the distribution of the degree of non-integration. 
There is only one region with this degree equaling 0 (it is the only region in the range of 0 to 5%). 
The most frequent case (19%) is non-integration with 15% to 20% of other regions. The range of the 
degree of non-integration is very wide, running to 78.2%.   
 
                                                          
2 Note that each region is herein taken twice, in pair (r, s) and (s, r). That is why this figure exceeds the total percentage 
of integrated and conditionally integrated pairs. 
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Figure 5. Distributions of the degree of non-integration and degree of divergence.  
 
An unpleasant feature of non-integration is significant abundance of price divergence. As 
mentioned above, the number of cases of divergence may actually be more, since only those are 
detected that satisfy Equation (7) with incorrect sign of estimated parameter δ. The cases of 
divergence are more than twice as much as the cases of convergence. Price divergence is responsible 
for 46% of non-integration. The right panel of Figure 5 plots the distribution of the degree of 
divergence. Only three regions do not diverge with any one other. The most frequent case is price 
divergence with 5% to 10% of regions; it occurs in a bit less than a half (45.6%) of regions. About a 
third of regions (32.9%) diverge with a greater number of other regions, up to 53.8% of them. 
Figure 6 relates the results to geography, mapping ‘integration rates’ of regions, that is, the 
total percentage (as a range) of regions with which a given region is integrated, conditionally 
integrated, and tends towards integration. Note that the ‘integration rate’ is reverse to the degree of 
non-integration (column “Not integrated with” in Table 1 and the left panel of Figure 5), equaling 
100% minus this degree.  
The European part of Russia comprises 57 regions westward from the Tyumen Oblast 
(numbered as 64); the rest – 22 regions – is the Asian part of the country. In turn, it consists of 
Siberia and the Russian Far East. Siberia comprises regions from the Tyumen Oblast (including it) 
eastward up to the western border of Yakutia (region 71) and the Amur Oblast (region 76). Regions 
to the east of this border belong to the Russian Far East. Taking a look at the map, some unexpected 
features are seen. Given much shorter distances and more developed transport infrastructure in the 
European part of Russia than in its Asian part, one would a priory expect the former to be more 
strongly integrated than the latter. However, a significant number of poorly integrated regions are 
present in the European part. Except for the northern Arkhangelsk Oblast (region 2) and the exclave
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Figure 3. Geography of market integration in Russia: ‘integration rates’ for country’s regions.  
See Table 1 for numerical designations of regions. 
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Kaliningrad Oblast (region 10), the rest cases can be hardly explained by geographical reasons. At 
the same time, integration in Siberia is fairly strong; there is the only region with the ‘integration 
rate’ below 70% (the Novosibirsk Oblast, region 61); many regions have the ‘integration rate’ above 
90%. Poor integration of Far Eastern regions is quite expectable. Surprisingly, the most remote in 
Russia and difficult-to-access regions, Chukotka (region 73) and Kamchatka (region 77) have 
‘integration rates’ exceeding 90%.     
Table 2 lists the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ regions with respect to different aspects of market 
integration. Values are expressed in percentage (of 78 regions). 
 
Table 2. Ranking of regions by different indicators of market integration  
 
The most integrated region Integrated with The least integrated region Integrated with 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 56.4 61. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  0 
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 51.3 73. Chukotka A.O. 0 
30. Voronezh Obl. 50.0 79. Sakhalin Obl. 0 
42. Rep. of Adygeya  48.7 74. Primorsky Krai 1.3 
60. Kemerovo Obl. 46.2 75. Khabarovsk Krai 1.3 
18. Oryol Obl. 44.9 77. Kamchatka Krai 1.3 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 44.9 78. Magadan Obl. 1.3 
The most integrated and 
conditionally-integrated region 
Integrated and 
conditionally 
integrated with 
The least integrated and 
conditionally-integrated region 
Integrated and 
conditionally 
integrated with 
67. Rep. of Khakasia  93.6 31. Kursk Obl. 21.8 
15. Kostroma Obl. 92.3 40. Saratov Obl 32.1 
42. Rep. of Adygeya  92.3 75. Khabarovsk Krai 32.1 
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  92.3 16. Moscow City 33.3 
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 92.3   9. Pskov Obl. 35.9 
66. Rep. of Tuva 92.3 74. Primorsky Krai 37.2 
  8. Novgorod Obl. 89.7 76. Amur Obl. 44.9 
69. Irkutsk Obl. 89.7   3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 46.2 
70. Transbaikal Krai 89.7 73. Chukotka A.O 46.2 
The least non-integrated region Not integrated with The most non-integrated region Not integrated with 
77. Kamchatka Krai 0 31. Kursk Obl. 78.2 
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 5.1 40. Saratov Obl 67.9 
59. Altai Krai 5.1 75. Khabarovsk Krai 65.4 
73. Chukotka A.O. 5.1 74. Primorsky Krai 57.7 
15. Kostroma Obl. 6.4   9. Pskov Obl. 53.8 
42. Rep. of Adygeya 6.4 76. Amur Obl. 52.6 
67. Rep. of Khakasia 6.4   3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 51.3 
66. Rep. of Tuva 6.4 78. Magadan Obl. 47.4 
 
Obl. = Oblast, Rep. = Republic, and A.O. = Autonomous Okrug. 
The data in the upper panel of Table 2 look reasonable. Regarding its left part, the most 
integrated regions are from the European part of Russia, except for the Kemerovo Oblast from 
 17 
Siberia. The rightmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 3 is due to Ingushetia; the next four 
regions form two preceding bars. As for the least integrated regions, all they are remote Far Eastern 
regions; hence, ‘strict integration’ (with no price disparities with other regions) can occur in rare 
cases. It is these seven regions that form the leftmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 3. 
Six first regions in the left part of the middle panel of Table 2 form the rightmost histogram 
bar in the right panel of Figure 3. Interestingly, the first region here is from Siberia. There are two 
more Siberian regions in the list, and even one from the Far East. Thus, about a half of regions 
integrated or conditionally integrated with the most number of other regions are from the Asian part 
of Russia. Turning to the right part of this panel, the presence of Far Eastern regions as well as the 
northern Arkhangelsk Oblast looks reasonable. However, four regions here are from the European 
part of the country. The ‘worst’ is the Kursk Oblast (the leftmost histogram bar in the right panel of 
Figure 3 is due to it only). This is quite unexplainable, the more so as the Kursk Oblast is adjacent to 
the Oryol Oblast (region 18) which is integrated/conditionally integrated with 87.2% of regions and 
is among regions with the highest ‘integration rate.’ The same relates to the Saratov and Pskov 
oblasts surrounded by strongly integrated regions. The situation with Moscow is more or less 
understandable. The Moscow market is known for many and varied impediments to access to the 
market, at least in the early 2000s. 
The lower panel of Table 2 deals with the absence of integration (‘strict’ and conditional) and 
the movement to it, which is reverse to the ‘integration rate.’ Kamchatka turns out to be the best in 
this respect (and forms the leftmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 5). This is due to the 
fact that Kamchatka is integrated (in one case) and conditionally integrated with 81% of regions and 
tends towards integration with 19% of rest regions. The case of Chukotka, the most eastern region of 
Russia, is also interesting. Albeit it is conditionally integrated with only 46% of regions, it tends 
towards integration with 49% of regions (determining the rightmost histogram bar in Figure 4). This 
results in a very high ‘integration rate,’ 95%.  
Of the eight ‘worst’ regions in the right part of the lower panel of Table 2, seven are the same 
as in its middle panel, the top three coinciding. Moscow is not present here because of convergence 
with 24% of regions. Instead, the Magadan Oblast appears that converges with only one region. No 
one case of price convergence with other regions is observed in the Kursk and Saratov oblasts (it is 
the Kursk Oblast that forms the rightmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 5). Convergence 
with two regions occurs in the Khabarovsk Krai, and Amur and Arkhangelsk oblasts. The Primorsky 
Krai and Pskov Oblast converge with four and eight regions, respectively. Contrastingly, price 
divergence is widespread among these regions; they diverge with 25.6% to 53.8% of regions. 
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Regions listed in the right part of the lower panel of Table 2 are at the same time those with 
maximum cases of price divergence. The Kursk Oblast and Khabarovsk Krai form the rightmost 
histogram bar in the right panel of Figure 4, diverging with more than a half of regions. 
 
5. 2001–2015 vs. 1994–2000  
As it is mentioned in Introduction, Gluschenko (2011) reports a spatial pattern of market integration 
in Russia in 1994–2000. It is interesting to compare this with the pattern obtained for 2001–2015, 
albeit these two analyses are not fully comparable. Firstly, they differ in data used. For 1994–2000, 
the cost of a staples basket consisting of 25 foods has been analyzed, while the 33-food basket is 
used here. The difference is not only in the number of goods, but also in their quantities across the 
baskets. Secondly, the price data for 1994–2000 are those collected in capital cities of regions, 
whereas the data for 2001–2015 are regional averages (to be exact, averages over cities/ towns 
where prices are being observed by the official statistics in a given region). Secondly, the 1994–
2000 analysis covers 75 regions (2775 region pairs); it does not include the Moscow and Leningrad 
oblasts, Ingushetia, and Chukotka. Thirdly, the analyses differ in methodology. The analysis for 
1994–2000 uses a benchmark region, exploits general-to-specific approach, and classes 
conditionally integrated pairs as non-integrated (since most price disparities were so great that could 
not be assigned to transportation costs only). However, Table A2 in Gluschenko (2011) reports 
results of estimation across all region pairs for selection of the ‘best’ benchmark region.3 Besides, 
benefiting from unpublished intermediate results of the 1994–2000 analysis, it is possible to make 
the methodologies comparable. Table 3 compares summarized patterns obtained for 1994–2000 and 
2001–2015 within the framework of both specific-to-general and general-to-specific approaches.   
   
Table 3. Comparison of integration patterns for 1994–2000 and 2001–2015, percentage of region 
pairs  
 
Group of region pairs Specific to general General to specific 
 1994–2000 2001–2015 1994–2000 2001–2015 
Integrated 54.7 26.8 25.8 8.6 
Conditionally integrated 29.2 44.6 32.6 30.7 
Tending towards integration 11.3 4.7 34.3 18.4 
Total  95.2 76.2 92.7 57.7 
Non-integrated 4.8 23.8 7.3 42.3 
Diverging 1.1 11.0 3.6 29.5 
 
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that the Saratov Oblast was chosen, as it generated the greatest number of integrated region pairs. In 
2001–2015, this region turns out to be the second ‘worst.’ This is one more argument against the benchmark approach. 
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There is a great difference between the periods of 1994–2000 and 2001–2015. Prior to 1992, 
the overwhelming part of consumer prices in Russia was centrally-fixed; in January 1992, they were 
liberalized (decontrolled). However, no market institutions existed by that time; the wholesale trade 
and the most part of retail trade were state-owned. Such institutions were emerging during the early 
1990s due to mass privatization and market self-organization. As a result, spatial goods arbitrage 
came into play since about 1994; beginning in that year, improvement in integration of Russia’s 
regional market was observed. The period of 1994–2000 was that of further transition from 
centrally-planned to market economy; ‘artificial’ barriers to inter-regional trade becoming 
progressively lowered (Gluschenko, 2010). In 2001–2015, by contrast, the Russian economy was 
functioning as a market one; at least, there were no fundamental differences in the functioning of 
markets for consumer goods in Russia and long-standing market economies. 
Therefore, one would expect integration in 1994–2000 to be poorer than in 2001–2015 (with a 
greater number of region pairs tending towards integration). Surprisingly, this is not the case. The 
‘integration rate’ in 1994–2000 is significantly higher, exceeding 90% under both approaches. The 
use of the general-to-specific approach decreases the ‘integration rate’ by only 2.5 percent points. If 
this approach would be applied to obtain the 2001–2015 pattern, the ‘integration rate’ dropped by 
18.5 percent points, to 58%. As expected, the share of region pairs tending towards integration is 
greater in 1994–2000. However, this is not the reason for higher ‘integration rate;’ the share of 
integrated and conditionally integrated pairs is also greater in 1994–2000: 86.6% as compared to 
71.4% in 2001–2015 (58.4% vs. 39.3%, respectively, under the general-to-specific approach). The 
most unexpected is widespread ‘strict’ integration in 1994–2000. The percentage of integrated pairs 
in that period is twice (or even three times) as much as in 2001–2015. The cases of prices 
divergence were rare in 1994–2000. In the next period, their number dramatically increased, up to 
almost one third, if additional 18.5% of region pairs exhibiting weak divergence trends (revealed by 
the general-to-specific approach) were taken into consideration. 
Possibly, unexpected features in the difference between the 1994–2000 and 2001–2015 
patterns can be partially explained by the difference in the data. If the cost of the staples basket with 
wider coverage of goods and cities were used for 1994–2000, the integration pattern would become 
worse. Gluschenko (2009, Figures 5 and 6) provides an indirect confirmation of this hypothesis. The 
degree of market segmentation estimated with the use of the 33-staples basket is higher than that 
estimated with the use of the 25-staples basket. One more hypothetical reason is the effect of the 
1998 financial crisis in Russia. It caused structural breaks in many time series of price differentials; 
the breaks were distributed over August 1998 through January 1999. Thus, the after-break time span 
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is rather short, containing 22 to 29 points in time. This would have prevented revealing actual 
behavior of price differentials after the break that differed significantly from the ‘pre-break’ 
behavior, overstating the ‘integration rate.’  
However, these factors could provide only partial explanation. In general, reasons of poorer 
integration in 2001–2015 as compared with 1994–2000 are unclear. This relates specifically to the 
disintegration tendency stretching over more than a tenth of region pairs in 2001–2015. More 
detailed and deeper study is needed to explain reasons behind the obtained pattern of market 
integration. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using the cost of the basket of 33 basic food goods as the price representative, the spatial pattern of 
market integration in Russia in 2001–2015 was analyzed. It was found that about 71% of region 
pairs in Russia could be deemed integrated or conditionally integrated, and about 5% could be 
classified as tending towards integration with each other. An unpleasant feature in the pattern 
obtained is a significant share (11%) of region pairs inclined to disintegration, i.e. exhibiting price 
divergence.  
There are a number of poorly integrated regions in the European part of Russia. This seems 
strange from the viewpoint of their favorable geographical positions. Intuitive considerations 
suggest that market integration in Russia in 2001–2015 should be stronger than in 1994–2000, when 
transition from centrally-planed to market economy was in progress. Surprisingly, this has not been 
confirmed. Further research has to find explanation of this fact as well as reasons for 
incomprehensible features of the pattern obtained.  
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Appendix. Technical details of unit root testing 
For testing the unit root hypotheses, Hλ, the t-statistic of λ is used, τ = λ/σλ (it has nonstandard 
distributions and is therefore denoted τ , and not t). Two tests employed take account of possible 
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autocorrelation of a form other than AR(1). To do so, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test uses 
an auxiliary regression which includes additional lags of the dependent variable. The Schwarz 
information criterion serves for choosing the optimal lag length. To choose it, the lag length varies 
from 0 to Kmax = [12(T/100)1/4], where [⋅] stands for integer part, while the number of included 
observations remains constant and equals T – 1 – Kmax according to Ng and Perron (2005). Then the 
reestimation of auxiliary regression with the optimal number of lags and actual number of 
observations yields the adjusted value of λ and, in turn, τ which is tested for significance as p(τ) ≤ 
π*, where p(τ) is the (cumulative) probability function, and π* is an adopted significance level (0.1 
in this study). Note that the auxiliary regression is purely technical, used only for obtaining adjusted 
value ofτ; the estimates of λ and other regression parameters should be taken from the original 
regression. In the Phillips-Perron test, the Phillips (1987) transformation is applied, using the 
Newey-West (1994) automatic bandwidth selection method with the Bartlett spectral kernel. In 
contrast to the ADF test, this transformation adjusts value of σλ rather than λ.  
Although distributions p(τ) are nonstandard, they are documented in the literature (e.g., 
MacKinnon, 1996) for the cases of Equations (5) and (6) as well as for equations with a linear and 
quadratic trends. These distributions (known as the Dickey-Fuller distributions) are built-in tool of 
different econometric packages. As for Equation (7) with different nonlinear trends, there are no 
ready-to-use distributions. To derive them, the empirical distributions of τ under the null hypothesis 
of random walk have been estimated with the use of the Monte Carlo method with 1,000,000 
replications. Table A1 reports selected critical values of the τ-statistics for Equation (7) with trends 
(8a)–(8c) and sample size T = 180. Figure A1 plots the 10-percent tails of the distributions, 
comparing them with the Dickey-Fuller distributions for the cases of linear and quadratic trends. 
 
Table A1. Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics for Equation (7) 
  
Significance  
level 
Log-exponential 
trend (8a) 
Exponential 
trend (8b) 
Fractional trend 
(8c) 
0.1% –4.528 –4.463 –6.616 
1% –3.848 –3.865 –5.162 
5% –3.230 –3.279 –3.825 
10% –2.908 –2.974 –3.302 
20% –2.522 –2.614 –2.796 
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Figure A1. Distributions of τ-statistics for Equation (7). 
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